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Risco v Alexander

This May 15, 2012 1 DCA reverses Judge Terlizzese's JCC decision that the claimant had not settled his workers compensation claim.

While represented Claimant’s signed an “Exit Interview & Separation of Employment Agreement”. After signing the Release, the claimant filed a petition for benefits. The plain language of the release indicates it applied to Claimant’s employment relationship with the Employer, it was not necessary for the agreement to be submitted to the JCC for it to be a settlement of Claimant’s workers’ compensation case.

Pursuant to section 440.20(11)(c), a represented “claimant may waive all rights to any and all benefits under this chapter by entering into a settlement agreement releasing the [E/C] from liability for workers’ compensation benefits in exchange for a lump-sum payment to the claimant.”
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