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Jones v Royalty Food

This March 12, 2012 1DCA decision reversed a JCC decision of Judge Pitts.

The claimant argued that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in dismissing his petitions for benefits as a sanction for nonpayment of an earlier award of prevailing party costs to the Employer/Carrier. The claimant was indigent, unemployed, and homeless.

The JCC found that the claimant simply did not have the financial ability to pay the outstanding costs and that the claimant was not willfully refusing to comply with the Order Taxing cost.

The 1DCA  held that in exercising his or her discretion, the JCC may not dismiss a petition for benefits absent a specific finding that a party or its attorney has willfully refused to comply with an order. Based on the above, the 1DCA found that the JCC did not find that the claimant’s conduct was willful, deliberate or contumacious, and reversed the JCC decision.

Click to see 1DCA opinion

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