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Williams V City of Orlando


This June 13, 2012 1DCA reversed Judge Condry's JCC decision. The JCC denied compensability of the claimant's hypertension on the ground she failed to establish eligibility to rely on the statutory presumption occupational causation available via section 112.18.
The claimant met three of the four requirements of section 112.18:
1   She was a police officer,
2   Her condition resulted in disability,
3   She successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into service.
The JCC found that the claimant's essential hypertension did not meet the 4th requirement which indicates that the condition itself be one of those listed in section 112.18: "tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.
The claimant was diagnosed with essential hypertension. She introduced unrefuted medical opinion testimony that essential hypertension was the same thing and the same condition as arterial hypertension.
In Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing City of Miami v. Thomas, 657 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)), the 1DCA had previously held that the 112.18 hypertension must be "arterial or cardiovascular."
Click here to see the 1DCA decision

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